This post assumes familiarity with Tropes or God, I.
Rejecting (1)
In Relata-specificity: A Response to Vallicella, Betti argues that we can resist (5) by rejecting (1).
Betti begins her argument by distinguishing relata-specific and relata-unspecific relations. A relation is relata-specific if and only if it's in its nature to relate specific relata; in contrast, it's relata-unspecific if and only if it isn't in its nature to relate specific relata. Relata-specific relations are unsaturated entities into which only specific objects fit; relata-unspecific relations aren't unsaturated entities into which only specific objects fit.
Betti then argues that if R in aRb can be construed as the relata-specific a_R_b, aRb can be identified with the sum a + a_R_b + b; R in aRb can be construed as the relata-specific a_R_b; hence, aRb can be identified with the sum a + a_R_b + b; hence, there isn't necessarily a real difference between aRb and the sum a + R + b. In other words, she argues that relata-specific relations can be used to reject (1).
If Betti is right, we can resist (5) by rejecting (1).
Simple or Complex? Vallicella's Reply
In his review of Betti's Against Facts, Vallicella argues that, one, R can only be relata-specific if it's identical to aRb and incorporates its relata; two, if R is identical to aRb, it can't account for the unity of aRb; thus three, if R is relata-specific, it can't account for the unity of aRb; thus four, relata-specific relations can't be used to reject (1).
But why accept that R can only be relata-specific if it's identical to aRb? Construing relata-specific relations as unsaturated entities into which only specific objects fit provides a seemingly fine explanation for why they're relata-specific, and doesn't obviously make R into aRb.
We can go a step further than Betti herself does and bolster her explanation by turning Brentano on his head and making primitive directedness a mark of non-mental entities either instead of or as well as mental entities.
We can go a step further than Betti herself does and bolster her explanation by turning Brentano on his head and making primitive directedness a mark of non-mental entities either instead of or as well as mental entities.
I wrote this article about a year ago and, at the time, I was keen to uphold something like Martin's naturalism. I no longer find naturalism convincing. I still, however, think that we must admit primitive directedness into our ontologies somewhere, and can find no real objection to admitting it in the non-mental world.
I would be interested if anyone can.
I would be interested if anyone can.
Further reading:
I'm not sure if I understand the distinctions, so, are relata-unspecific relations supposed to be relate relations which are internal to an entity, and thus, saturated, whereas relata-specific relations are unsaturated and thus can be treated as sums?
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