Maitzen and the Problem of Magic

This entry looks at Stephen Maitzen’s essay ‘The Problem of Magic’, which is available from his website here. Said essay is interesting not for the actual arguments it contains but for the implied metaphysical cost of its background. For the sake of charity I will say now that I am only aware of Maitzen’s work through a number of his essays in philosophy of religion and that these may not be an adequate representation of his ability as a philosopher.

In the course of the essay Maitzen sets out to argue several claims, most prominently that that the intelligibility of the universe does not require God and that theism or other forms of supernaturalism in fact threaten its intelligibility. I will focus my attention on his later thesis and only make a few observations on the first part of the discussion.

Two Arguments for Divine Simplicity

This post discusses two arguments philosophers have sometimes given in favour of divine simplicity. I do not believe either are successful but will give an overview of them as a preamble to more substantial arguments for and against this position.

Complexity Implies Causation

The first argument is discussed at length in a fine article ‘Divine Simplicity, Aseity, and Sovereignty’ by Matthew Baddorf; it is the claim that complexity implies causation, that if an entity is complex then it requires an efficient cause of its existence. Neither Baddorf nor Paul Vincent Spade, who the former quotes in favour of that thesis, are aware of any reason for this dictum beyond a purported inductive generalisation from observed contingent beings to the effect: all contingent beings are complex therefore all complex beings are contingent¹. The case for such a generalisation is weak and the purported supporting evidence easily explained in other ways e.g. by the aseity claim that all contingent beings depend on God for their existence. If such is granted then of course all non-God entities will require a cause, regardless of whether we assay God as ontologically simple or complex. As an inductive argument complexity implies causation has as much dialectical force as J. H. Sobel’s necessity implies abstractness animadversion against traditional theism (all abstract objects are necessary, God is necessary, ergo God is an abstract object)².

The Metaphilosophy of Religion: Classical Theists versus Theistic Personalists, II

Whilst debates over the nature of simplicity are important, the polemical emphasis on them has served to obscure a more fundamental dispute in early analytical philosophy which threatened to leave us with a concept of God so radically different from the historical understanding as to call all ultimacy claims into question. The divine attribute under fire here was not simplicity or personhood but divine necessity—God’s status as a necessary being.

Almost all classical theists hold that God’s existence is necessary; indeed this claim is so fundamental that before modernity few philosophers, atheist or theist, thought to dispute it. Necessary here is meant in the strongest sense, that of logical necessity—for every way reality could be that way includes God’s existence⁶. That the Divine is that for which it is impossible not to be is one of the most ancient tenets of Western metaphysics dating back to Parmenides⁷. This intuition has been central to our notion of God for centuries before thinkers had the conceptual tools to explicate it within a particular logical framework—indeed it has been one of the prime motivations in philosophers’ seeking additionally sophisticated ways to articulate modal truths.

The Metaphilosophy of Religion: Classical Theists versus Theistic Personalists, I

A certain narrative pervades natural theology, particularly in Catholic quarters. This narrative is that analytical philosophy of religion, though greatly beneficial in resuscitating the intellectual respectability of theism, has lead philosophers down a blind alley by introducing a substantially false understanding of God termed by critics ‘theistic personalism’. This position, held by the majority of analytical theists, especially Protestants, stands opposed to and serves to obscure the traditional understanding of God known as ‘classical theism’, which has been standard from Plato to the early modern period. I hold that excess focus on this narrative has obscured a more fundamental dispute within early analytical treatments of God.

An Atheistic Argument from Bizarro Worlds

I’ve had a sketch of this argument written up in the Notes app on my phone for years. I thought it was relatively original but it turns out Hugh Chandler, a really under-regarded philosopher and one more students of modal metaphysics should read, beat me to it by some years. Chandler’s paper can be read here.

What follows is a short argument for atheism, or at least against the classical concept of God. I’m not suggesting it is very serious but it’s interesting because it highlights what is behind some of the more popular atheistic arguments.

Further Thoughts on the Maximal God Thesis

Nagasawa repeatedly affirms that holding the Maximal God thesis does not mean abandoning the omni-attributes, only not having to defend them as part of the perfect being thesis. Many theists however will reject this proposal straight out at the mere epistemic possibility of having to water down said attributes. Others will allege that the thesis anthropomorphises God or that it commits us to an account of properties incompatible with divine simplicity. Of these the simplicity question is probably the only one with (non-rhetorical) force, however it would take us on to a wider debate (probably the central debate for classical theism).

One objection that might be raised is that the three great-making properties Nagasawa discusses—power, knowledge and goodness—are each degreed properties i.e. those that admit of varying intensity. Although the Maximal God thesis makes sense in those cases it is difficult to see how it could be applied to divine timelessness, say, or simplicity, neither of which appear to admit of degrees. One could easily respond however that the Maximal God thesis is really intended as a development of the ‘Maximally Great’ definition of God employed in Plantinga’s formulation of the modal ontological argument, which was specifically intended to only capture a ‘bare bones’ picture of theism thus remaining neutral on further attribute debates. Whilst these attributes are important one is not required to defend them in the course of the ontological argument. This is probably a wise move: as Leftow and Gale have pointed out, the possibility of a timeless being or of a divinely simple being also entails the existence of said being, hence appealing to those attributes in the course of the ontological argument would render that argument superfluous. It could also be argued that, despite what Anselm himself may have thought, although timelessness and simplicity are attributes of God they are not great-making properties, that are entailed by God’s status as a perfect being.

A related objection is that theists may already have a priori commitment to the Omni-God thesis in virtue of other theistic arguments and background ontological assumptions. Many philosophers would take issue with Nagasawa’s claim that the ontological argument is the only direct argument for the God of perfect being theism and that at best the other arguments only show the existence of a being with impressive properties e.g. vast degrees of power or intelligence, compatible with God thus understood. Although the Gaps Problem is often touted as a serious objection it follows directly from certain variations on the PSR and powers cosmological arguments that the being in question has at least the power to actualise all possible states of affairs if not also agency and knowledge of all such states. Again defenders of the Maximal God thesis can respond that they do not a priori reject the Omni-God thesis, thus if the reasoning behind the these cosmological arguments is cogent then we have reason to think that Omnipotence and perhaps others are included amongst the maximally consistent set of positive properties God possesses.

Here there is a danger of critics of theism digging their heels in and claiming that far from establishing the existence of an Omnipotent being the fact that the cosmological argument would entail such gives us reason to reject it, as we already know such a being is impossible on the basis of a type A or type B objection (see Vallicella’s ‘Simple Atheist’ for an account of this problem albeit with simplicity instead of omnipotence). Responses vary from tackling the objection head-on with a refutation, the preferred approach since most of them are not that formidable, or ceding the cosmological argument and retreating to Maximal God theism on the basis of the ontological argument.

The type B objection has potentially more interesting consequences if developed along the lines that the cosmological argument does establish the existence of an omnipotent being and that, necessarily, Omnipotence cannot be among the maximal consistent set of positive properties possessed by the perfect being. This would mean we have two necessary beings, one Omnipotent and one with the properties ascribed by the Maximal God thesis, a conclusion many theists would want to reject (then again I cannot see it being a conclusion that would please most atheists either). In order to reach such a conclusion though the critic would have to show that the omni-attribute in question is not only incompatible with other omni-attributes but also with Maximal God’s other properties. This strikes me as implausible on axiological grounds.

It goes without saying that those whose ontology entails or depends on the existence of beings with the omni-attributes cannot profit from the open-endedness of the Maximal God thesis or can only do so as a backup in the eventuality that their preferred metaphysics is proven wrong. This is perhaps another instance of the specific metaphysics problem I discussed in my instalments on Feser’s Five Proofs: epistemically complete theistic ontologies have the advantage in exhaustively mapping God’s relationship to the rest of reality but cannot permit any flexibility in the understanding of God involved.

Finally there is another family of omni-attribute arguments Nagasawa does not discuss, some of which may experience a rise in epistemic credibility given the Maximal God thesis. I refer here to what shall be termed explanatory role arguments, those which claim the existence of a being with a given omni-attribute can be provide the most satisfactory solution to a philosophical problem. Examples would be the proof from eternal truths (which holds an Omniscient necessary being is the best way to account for abstracta), Pruss’ argument that an Omnipotent being helps explain global possibilities and Alan Rhoda’s intriguing suggestion that a timeless Omniscient being could solve the truthmaker objection to Presentism.

Explanatory role arguments are often under examined by sympathetic theists and atheists, perhaps because of an underlying feeling that the perceived ‘costly addition’ of said beings to one’s ontology would dissuade anyone who was not a priori committed to them. Here the Maximal God thesis may be of use—if one has prior reason to believe for example that a very knowledgeable necessary being exists and that the existence of an Omniscient being would solve ontological problem then might not one conclude that said very knowledgeable being is probably Omniscient? If explanatory role reasons are not strong enough to justify positing the existence of an exotic additional being in the first place they might still be enough to give us reason to revise our understanding of an existing being i.e. Maximal God. Likewise for epistemic stalemate situations with for and against arguments—if the reasons for positing an omni-attributed being have the same epistemic weight as those against the existence of a being with said attribute, might not additional prior knowledge of the existence of a being with something very close to that attribute shift the epistemic balance in the omni-being’s favour? The former seems a better route than the latter.

Five Proofs Critique: The Aristotelian Proof

This next entry discusses Feser’s Aristotelian proof, the argument with which he opens the book, as well as a wider problem with Aristotelian accounts of agency and explanation. Central to this discussion is a certain account of free will mentioned in the last installment.