Saturday, 14 April 2018

FAQ: Substances and the Problem of Individuation

Another FAQ from the reading group. I was fond of apples at the time:
What is a substance?

A substance is something that bears properties but is not itself borne by anything else.

What's the difference between a substance-attribute theorist and a bundle theorist?

Substance-attribute theorists think a flower an irreducible-substance-instantiating-properties; bundle theorists, nothing more than a unity of properties. Substance-attribute theorists think there are irreducible substances; bundle theorists, that they're reducible to bundles of universals or tropes.

(Technical note: Having written this, there is a sense in which some bundle theorists substantialize first-order properties so those properties can themselves have properties.)

What is the Problem of Individuation?

Moreland writes:

To clarify . . ., recall Socrates and Plato, two red, round spots that share all their pure properties in common. The problem of individuation is the problem of offering an ontological [account] of the situation so as to specify what it is that makes the two red spots two particular, individual entities instead of one. (Universals)

Most people would use two red apples, not dots.

Friday, 30 March 2018

The Importance of Nietzsche

Some may like Heller's The Importance of Nietzsche. Others, who are almost certain to be triggered by it, may not. I recommend reading it either way. If you want to understand post-modern man, you must understand Nietzsche.

Thursday, 29 March 2018

One Blog, Three Bloggers

Ontological Investigations is one blog, but three bloggers. We aren't a hive mind, and what one of us posts shouldn't be taken as indicative of what all of us think.

Wednesday, 28 March 2018

Does existence have an essence?

This post assumes distinctions drawn here.

It's sometimes objected that since Thomists say that “that something is” (existence) is really distinct from “what something is” (essence), they can't account for “what existence is”.

The reply is that even though a's existence is distinct from a's essence (a), it doesn't follow that a's existence doesn't have its own essence. So assuming Thomists can give some account of existence (e.g. Barry Miller argues that existence is a property), they can account for “what existence is”.

Three Essential Distinctions

The first is between a's essence and a. a's essence is identical with a. a is identical with a's essence. No matter how you slice it, they're the same thing. (a's essence encompasses all of what a is.) Essence and nature are synonyms.

The second is between a's essence and its substantial form (natural kind). a's essence is what a is; a's substantial form is the natural kind-universal or -instance that is a constituent of a. “a's essence” (a) includes its particularity, and we more or less come to know it through the senses; a's substantial form doesn't include a's particularity, and has to be abstracted from that which we acquire through the senses. If you muddle this distinction, you're going to run into questions like “How do we know x individual's essence?”

The third is between a's essence and a's existence. a's essence is just a. a's existence (say Thomists) is something additional to a (e.g. Barry Miller's existence property-instances). The result (if they're right) is that there is a real distinction between a and existing a.

Thursday, 22 March 2018

Properties or Properties?

There is an ambiguity in how philosophers use "properties". Sometimes we talk about properties (universals) as opposed to particulars. Other times, properties as opposed to substances.