The other statement, "Every saying, etc.," equally compels suspension of judgement; when facts disagree, but the contradictory statements have exactly the same weight, ignorance of the truth is the necessary consequence. But even this statement has its corresponding antithesis, so that after destroying others it turns round and destroys itself, like a purge which drives the substance out and then in its turn is itself eliminated and destroyed.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9.11.
Tuesday, 29 May 2018
Monday, 28 May 2018
The Ladder
Just as it is not impossible that a man who has used a ladder to climb up to a high place should overturn the ladder with his foot, so it is not unlikely that the Skeptic, having used the argument that shows that there is no proof as a kind of scaffolding to establish his thesis, should then destroy that argument itself.
Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians. Translated by Striker.
Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians. Translated by Striker.
Sunday, 27 May 2018
Review: Maximal God by Yujin Nagasawa
Reader's Note: Next week I will publish a follow-up entry giving more of my own thoughts on the book's central thesis. Since this review, like all of my Ontological Investigations reviews, was partly written with Amazon in mind it was neither desirable nor feasible to an in-depth technical response within the review itself.
In Maximal God Yujin Nagasawa presents an ambitious, fascinating and frustratingly sketchy development of perfect being theism. The book also contains a wealth of material on the ontological argument, including an overview of its history and a comprehensive discussion of the normally disregarded epistemic version originally given by Anselm. Nagasawa’s prose is admirably lucid and relatively free of technical jargon or the complex semantics of formal logic. Although the book requires a basic knowledge of analytical philosophy it will be accessible to anyone interested the topic and willing to put a bit of background reading in.
In Maximal God Yujin Nagasawa presents an ambitious, fascinating and frustratingly sketchy development of perfect being theism. The book also contains a wealth of material on the ontological argument, including an overview of its history and a comprehensive discussion of the normally disregarded epistemic version originally given by Anselm. Nagasawa’s prose is admirably lucid and relatively free of technical jargon or the complex semantics of formal logic. Although the book requires a basic knowledge of analytical philosophy it will be accessible to anyone interested the topic and willing to put a bit of background reading in.
Friday, 25 May 2018
The Aim of the Sceptic
It will be apposite to consider next the aim of the Sceptical persuasion. Now an aim is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it is not itself done or considered for the sake of anything else. Or: an aim is the final object of desire. Up to now we say the aim of the Sceptic is tranquility in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us. For Sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are true and which false, so as to become tranquil; but they came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they suspended judgment. And when they suspended judgment, tranquility in matters of opinion followed fortuitously.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Annas and Barnes.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Annas and Barnes.
Thursday, 24 May 2018
A Standstill of the Intellect
A Pyrrhonist's researches do not end in discovery; nor yet do they conclude that discovery is impossible. For they do not terminate at all: the researches continue, and the researcher finds himself in a condition of epoche. 'Epoche is defined as 'a standstill of the intellect, as a result of which we neither deny nor affirm anything'. The Sceptical investigator neither asserts nor denies, neither believes nor disbelieves.
Jonathan Barnes, "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist".
Jonathan Barnes, "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist".
Friday, 18 May 2018
Ού Μάλλον
'No more this than that' makes clear our feelings: because of the equipollence of the opposed objects we end in equilibrium. (By 'equipollence' we mean equality in what appears plausible to us; by 'opposed' we mean in general conflicting; and by 'equilibrium' we mean assent to neither side.) Thus, although the phrase 'In no way more' exhibits the distinctive character of assent or denial, we do not use it in this way: we use it indifferently and in a loose sense, either for a question or for 'I do not know which of these things I should assent to and which not assent to'. Our intention is to make clear what is apparent to us, and as to what phrase we use to make this clear we are indifferent. Note too that when we utter the phrase 'In no way more' we are not affirming that it is itself certainly true and firm: here too we are only saying how things appear to us.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Annas and Barnes.
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Annas and Barnes.
Thursday, 17 May 2018
One Blog, Three Bloggers
Ontological Investigations is one blog, but three bloggers. We aren't a hive mind, and what one of us posts shouldn't be taken as indicative of what all of us think.
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