Maitzen and the Problem of Magic

This entry looks at Stephen Maitzen’s essay ‘The Problem of Magic’, which is available from his website here. Said essay is interesting not for the actual arguments it contains but for the implied metaphysical cost of its background. For the sake of charity I will say now that I am only aware of Maitzen’s work through a number of his essays in philosophy of religion and that these may not be an adequate representation of his ability as a philosopher.

In the course of the essay Maitzen sets out to argue several claims, most prominently that that the intelligibility of the universe does not require God and that theism or other forms of supernaturalism in fact threaten its intelligibility. I will focus my attention on his later thesis and only make a few observations on the first part of the discussion.

What Is Going On With Ontological Investigations?

All our writers are currently in the process of moving to other continents or finishing the last two months of philosophy degrees.

We have several articles in various states of doneness languishing in suitcases or on our desks, and a regular podcast coming. Stay tuned.

When Are Universals?

Aficionados of Armstrong's work will appreciate Ernâni Magalhães's PhD thesis, When are universals? The relationship between universals and time. Others, too.

Merry Christmas

Things have gotten slow around here over the holidays, but we haven't forgotten about you. Regular posting will resume in January.

The Principle of Disagreement

Now the question raised by the mode of disagreement is this: Is the Principle of Disagreement true? And the answer is surely: Yes, the Principle is true. For suppose that it were not true. Then the following could be the case. I recognize that there is a dispute about the authenticity of the Magna Moralia, some holding that the work was written by Aristotle himself and others holding that it is a later counterfeit. I believe, further, that the dispute is still undecided: the parties have not come to any agreement, and no decisive argument or consideration for or against authenticity has yet been advanced. Nevertheless (if the Principle is false) it is rational for me to hold that the work is not authentic. Now it seems clear to me that this is incoherent; for how could it possibly be rational for me to plump for authenticity, thus opting for one side of the dispute, and yet still maintain that the dispute is undecided? If it is rational or warranted for me to decide against authenticity, then I must suppose that whatever warrants my decision also and thereby decides the dispute, which I can therefore no longer hold to be undecided. If, on the contrary, I insist that the disagreement remains undecided, then I cannot consistently suppose that my inclination to reject authenticity, whatever it may be founded upon, has any satisfactory justification; and hence it is not rational for me to reject authenticity.

Of course, I may adopt it as a 'working hypothesis' that the Magna Moralia is a counterfeit. I may act as if the work is spurious – say, by excluding it from my translation of the collected works of Aristotle. But in so acting I am not manifesting any belief that the work is spurious. I am not putting money on the horse. (Moreover, I may perhaps also hold that it is likely or probable that the work will turn out to be spurious. Then I shall indeed hold a belief on the matter – but not a belief which is, in any straightforward way, a party to the disagreement. For the disagreement is not over probabilities but over authenticity.) Thus while recognizing the existence of an unresolved dispute over authenticity, I may yet act as if the work is spurious (and perhaps even take it to be probably spurious); but I cannot rationally believe that it is spurious.

If the putative counter-example to the Principle of Disagreement is incoherent, then any putative counter-example is incoherent. And thus the Principle is true. Then since the Principle on which the mode of disagreement rests is true, the mode does indeed induce suspension of judgment. If I recognize undecided dispute over ?Q, then I must – I rationally must – suspend judgment over the matter.

Jonathan Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism.

I've discussed the principle of disagreement in a previous post here (the first premise), and thought some of you might be interested in Barnes's full argument for it.

Stoicism and the Four Noble Truths

Over the last decade or so an alliance of sorts has formed between the modern Stoic movement and a variety of Buddhist popularizers, especially those influenced by the secular Buddhist movement. It has been noted that both Buddhists and Stoics sought 1) to quiet their desires and minds through various techniques, 2) to impose on themselves a strict simplicity in thought, word, and deed, and 3) to take hold of a super-ordinary freedom. This point of view has been put forth in articles, books, and videoes. While no one reasonable claims that the two are identical (that Zeno would have become Bikkhu Zeno upon hearing a sermon, or that the the Buddha, had he traveled to Greece, would have set up shop under the Stoa) it often seems to me that the similarity is overstated between these two venerable traditions. As an experiment of sorts, I decided to imagine what a Stoic would think of the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism—how we would react and respond to the essential tenets of Buddhism, that were supposedly the core message of the very first sermon the Buddha taught after his Awakening.

The Franciscan Master

Today is the Feast of John Duns Scotus. I'm not Christian, but I have great respect for Scotus's work. Here is a quote from Efrem Bettoni's Duns Scotus: The Principles of his Philosophy depicting the great man in an act of intellectual heroism:

In 1304 Duns Scotus was already known both within and outside the Order as a religious of deep spirituality and as a man of wide culture and powerful mind. When Father Gonsalvus of Spain, Minister General of the Franciscan Order, proposed him to the Provincial of Paris as a candidate for a master's chair at the University of that city, he expressed himself in the following terms: "I recommend to your charity our beloved brother in Christ, Father John Scotus, whose laudable life, excellent knowledge, most subtle genius, and other remarkable qualities are fully known to me, partly because of my long association with him, and partly because of his widespread reputation.”

However, in 1304 Duns Scotus was no longer in Paris, as he had to leave the city suddenly in 1303, in the middle of the academic year. What was the reason for this sudden departure? In the first months of 1303 the struggle between Pope Boniface VIII and the King of France, Philip the Fair, which is better known from Dante's poem (cf. Purgatorio, XX, 85-93) than from the reports of historians, had become greatly intensified. Philip the Fair looked for adherents to his antipapal policies among the clergy. This led to a split even among the members of the religious orders. Duns Scotus, as is well documented by the list of the Friars Minor that took side with the Pope against the King—a list discovered and published by Father Ephrem Longpré in 1928—did not hesitate to follow the dictates of conscience and truth. Royal reprisal forced him to interrupt his teaching and return to Oxford in England, where he lectured during the scholastic year 1303-1304.

When in 1304, following the death of Boniface VIII, the storm subsided and all political difficulties were removed, John Duns Scotus was sent back to Paris by the Minister General in order to obtain the title of master. About Easter in 1305, when Simon of Guiberville was chancellor of the University, the official proclamation took place. 

This second period of teaching at the University of Paris became famous in scholastic tradition because of the theological dispute of the Subtle Doctor in favor of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Mother. Later traditions have invested this famous battle with legendary elements. Allegedly it ended in a grand finale, in which the Franciscan master, emulating in the field of culture the deeds of the bravest knights, victoriously withstood all the masters of the University of Paris, who were fierce opponents of his Mariology. However, the substantial historicity of this famous dispute has been proved in recent years by Father Charles Balic with an abundance of arguments which show how well Duns Scotus deserves the title of knight as well as of doctor of the Immaculate Conception.

The Goal of Skepticism

An article one of our authors, Brian York, wrote during his time as a student was recently published on pages eighty-five to ninety-three of the fourth issue of the independent journal Julep. I don't necessarily endorse everything he says in it, but it's worth checking out.

I haven't read any of the journal's other articles, which appear to be about subjects other than philosophy.

Can God Make a Picasso?

That God ultimately produced everything besides himself mediaeval philosophers had no doubt. But precisely what this creative act amounts to, whether and in what way it is ongoing, and how divine production relates to, say, human production—all these were important open questions. The title of this article is meant to focus our attention on one of the most interesting of these open questions, as it was discussed by Oxford philosophers Walter Chatton (d. 1343) and William Ockham (d. 1347). For while Chatton and Ockham would certainly have agreed that God is ultimately responsible for the existence of the works of Pablo Picasso (and indeed Picasso himself), they would not have agreed in precise detail about how to answer the question I intend in my title, that is: Does it violate God’s omnipotence to say that he cannot make something that Picasso made—for example, the painting Guernica—without using Picasso himself as an intermediate cause?

Rondo Keele. "Can God Make a Picasso? William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Divine Power and Real Relations". http://muse.jhu.edu/article/218279/pdf.

Constituent Versus Relational Ontologies

Since the relationship between God and universals is one factor in the controversy over divine ultimacy lurking behind the classical theist versus theist personalist dispute I discussed here, here and here, it seems fitting to review this old entry. 

Debates over the difference between Platonism and Aristotelianism, and the respective merits of each position, are likely to continue for as long as Man philosophizes. This post does not seek to take a stance on which position is correct but to provide clarification on an issue which is too often lumped into this debate, that is the way in which particulars are related to their universals.

I contend that many of the superficial charges Platonists and Aristotelians, particularly those who adopt such position in virtue of the role they play in wider philosophical systems, lay at one another's feet really relate to the alternative and more fundamental differences between constituent and relational ontologies. This entry is intended to give a brief run-through of these two approaches to ontology. To do so I will look at two claims attributed to each position, at least in popular presentations (let us call their proponents the ‘pop-Platonist’ and ‘pop-Aristotelian’ respectively).

Papers by David Lewis

I thought some of you might find Andrew Bailey's collection of David Lewis papers interesting. Lewis is wrong about a lot, but he's one of the finest prose stylists in recent analytic ontology and his papers usually have something of value in them.

Penetrate to the Very Marrow

... c'est [la raison] un guide qui s'égare: et l'on peut comparer la philosophie à des poudres si corrosives, qu'après avoir consumé les chairs haveuses d'une plaie, elles rongeraient la chair vive, et carieraient les os, et perceraient jusqu'aux moelles. La philosophie réfute d'abord les erreurs, mais, si on ne l'arrête point là, elle attaque les vérités: et quand on la laisse faire à sa fantaisie, elle va si loin qu'elle ne sait plus où elle est, ni ne trouve plus où s'asseoir.

... it [reason] is a guide that leads one astray; and philosophy can be compared to some powders that are so corrosive that, after they have eaten away the infected flesh of a wound, they then devour the living flesh, rot the bones, and penetrate to the very marrow. Philosophy at first refutes errors. But if it is not stopped at this point, it goes on to attack truths. And when it is left on its own, it goes so far that it no longer knows where it is and can find no stopping place.

Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. Translated by Popkin.

Skepticism and Mysticism

What, if any, connection is there between skepticism and mysticism? First off, we should be clear what we are talking about. By skepticism I mean the Pyrrhonian skeptical tradition, exemplified by the writings of Sextus Empiricus. On this definition, the skeptic is someone who employs arguments on both sides of any issue. Finding that the arguments on both sides of any issue have equal strength, the skeptic suspends judgment about the truth or reality of that particular issue. By mysticism I mean the belief that one can achieve super-human knowledge inaccessible to ordinary reason or super-natural states of Being unachievable by ordinary practices or processes.

Two Arguments for Divine Simplicity

This post discusses two arguments philosophers have sometimes given in favour of divine simplicity. I do not believe either are successful but will give an overview of them as a preamble to more substantial arguments for and against this position.

Complexity Implies Causation

The first argument is discussed at length in a fine article ‘Divine Simplicity, Aseity, and Sovereignty’ by Matthew Baddorf; it is the claim that complexity implies causation, that if an entity is complex then it requires an efficient cause of its existence. Neither Baddorf nor Paul Vincent Spade, who the former quotes in favour of that thesis, are aware of any reason for this dictum beyond a purported inductive generalisation from observed contingent beings to the effect: all contingent beings are complex therefore all complex beings are contingent¹. The case for such a generalisation is weak and the purported supporting evidence easily explained in other ways e.g. by the aseity claim that all contingent beings depend on God for their existence. If such is granted then of course all non-God entities will require a cause, regardless of whether we assay God as ontologically simple or complex. As an inductive argument complexity implies causation has as much dialectical force as J. H. Sobel’s necessity implies abstractness animadversion against traditional theism (all abstract objects are necessary, God is necessary, ergo God is an abstract object)².

Dogmatists

The ancient sceptics labelled their opponents 'dogmatists'. The word 'dogmatist' in contemporary English has a pejorative tone – it hints at an irrational rigidity of opinion, a refusal to look impartially at the evidence. In its ancient sense the word lacked that tone: a dogmatist was simply someone who subscribed to dogmas or doctrines. We shall use the word in the ancient sense. The disadvantage of this practice is off-set by the convenience of having a short label for all those who are not sceptical philosophers.

Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism.

From the Mailbag: The Modes of Aenesidemus

I've been asked to say more about ancient skeptical arguments. An old friend, Charlie Black, writes:

I was wondering when you planned to write more on skepticism. In particular, I am interested in the modes in the early part of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines and whether you can update them into analytic idiom.

Part of the reason I've avoided writing more about the skeptical arguments (in spite of some past posts) is that many are fairly bad.¹ This, for me, makes them less exciting than if they were good. I'm still mainly interested in advancing the lot of philosophy or, at least, showing that it can't be advanced.

The Thoroughly Empirical Science

Metaphysics is the thoroughly empirical science. Every item of experience must be evidence for or against any hypothesis of speculative cosmology, and every experienced object must be an exemplar and test case for the categories of analytic ontology.

Donald Cary Williams. “The Elements of Being”. Principles of Empirical Realism, 1966, pp. 74–75.

The Method of Subtraction

The method of subtraction is simply a useful dodge when attempting logical analysis. In order to see whether a certain condition c is, or is not, a necessary condition for the occurrence of a certain sort of situation s, try conceiving of cases of s where it is given that c does not hold. It may turn out to be fairly clear that the notion of s without c is an incoherent conception, and so fairly clear that c is necessary for s. This simple technique, which resembles the method of reductio ad absurdum in mathematics and logic, and the 'method of difference' in empirical research, can be astonishingly fruitful. The neglect to apply it can lead to a lot of unnecessary beating about the bush.

D. M. Armstrong. Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 81–82.

The Metaphilosophy of Religion: Classical Theists versus Theistic Personalists, II

Whilst debates over the nature of simplicity are important, the polemical emphasis on them has served to obscure a more fundamental dispute in early analytical philosophy which threatened to leave us with a concept of God so radically different from the historical understanding as to call all ultimacy claims into question. The divine attribute under fire here was not simplicity or personhood but divine necessity—God’s status as a necessary being.

Almost all classical theists hold that God’s existence is necessary; indeed this claim is so fundamental that before modernity few philosophers, atheist or theist, thought to dispute it. Necessary here is meant in the strongest sense, that of logical necessity—for every way reality could be that way includes God’s existence⁶. That the Divine is that for which it is impossible not to be is one of the most ancient tenets of Western metaphysics dating back to Parmenides⁷. This intuition has been central to our notion of God for centuries before thinkers had the conceptual tools to explicate it within a particular logical framework—indeed it has been one of the prime motivations in philosophers’ seeking additionally sophisticated ways to articulate modal truths.

The Metaphilosophy of Religion: Classical Theists versus Theistic Personalists, I

A certain narrative pervades natural theology, particularly in Catholic quarters. This narrative is that analytical philosophy of religion, though greatly beneficial in resuscitating the intellectual respectability of theism, has lead philosophers down a blind alley by introducing a substantially false understanding of God termed by critics ‘theistic personalism’. This position, held by the majority of analytical theists, especially Protestants, stands opposed to and serves to obscure the traditional understanding of God known as ‘classical theism’, which has been standard from Plato to the early modern period. I hold that excess focus on this narrative has obscured a more fundamental dispute within early analytical treatments of God.