Papers by David Lewis

I thought some of you might find Andrew Bailey's collection of David Lewis papers interesting. Lewis is wrong about a lot, but he's one of the finest prose stylists in recent analytic ontology and his papers usually have something of value in them.

Penetrate to the Very Marrow

... c'est [la raison] un guide qui s'égare: et l'on peut comparer la philosophie à des poudres si corrosives, qu'après avoir consumé les chairs haveuses d'une plaie, elles rongeraient la chair vive, et carieraient les os, et perceraient jusqu'aux moelles. La philosophie réfute d'abord les erreurs, mais, si on ne l'arrête point là, elle attaque les vérités: et quand on la laisse faire à sa fantaisie, elle va si loin qu'elle ne sait plus où elle est, ni ne trouve plus où s'asseoir.

... it [reason] is a guide that leads one astray; and philosophy can be compared to some powders that are so corrosive that, after they have eaten away the infected flesh of a wound, they then devour the living flesh, rot the bones, and penetrate to the very marrow. Philosophy at first refutes errors. But if it is not stopped at this point, it goes on to attack truths. And when it is left on its own, it goes so far that it no longer knows where it is and can find no stopping place.

Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. Translated by Popkin.

Skepticism and Mysticism

What, if any, connection is there between skepticism and mysticism? First off, we should be clear what we are talking about. By skepticism I mean the Pyrrhonian skeptical tradition, exemplified by the writings of Sextus Empiricus. On this definition, the skeptic is someone who employs arguments on both sides of any issue. Finding that the arguments on both sides of any issue have equal strength, the skeptic suspends judgment about the truth or reality of that particular issue. By mysticism I mean the belief that one can achieve super-human knowledge inaccessible to ordinary reason or super-natural states of Being unachievable by ordinary practices or processes.

Two Arguments for Divine Simplicity

This post discusses two arguments philosophers have sometimes given in favour of divine simplicity. I do not believe either are successful but will give an overview of them as a preamble to more substantial arguments for and against this position.

Complexity Implies Causation

The first argument is discussed at length in a fine article ‘Divine Simplicity, Aseity, and Sovereignty’ by Matthew Baddorf; it is the claim that complexity implies causation, that if an entity is complex then it requires an efficient cause of its existence. Neither Baddorf nor Paul Vincent Spade, who the former quotes in favour of that thesis, are aware of any reason for this dictum beyond a purported inductive generalisation from observed contingent beings to the effect: all contingent beings are complex therefore all complex beings are contingent¹. The case for such a generalisation is weak and the purported supporting evidence easily explained in other ways e.g. by the aseity claim that all contingent beings depend on God for their existence. If such is granted then of course all non-God entities will require a cause, regardless of whether we assay God as ontologically simple or complex. As an inductive argument complexity implies causation has as much dialectical force as J. H. Sobel’s necessity implies abstractness animadversion against traditional theism (all abstract objects are necessary, God is necessary, ergo God is an abstract object)².