The Regularity Theory of Causation

I'm sometimes told that the regularity theory of causation dominates Anglo philosophy. That isn't, however, true. The regularity theory fell out of favor in the '70s. You can learn more here.

A Skeptical Thought Experiment

Consider the following thought experiment:

An angel shows himself to you. In his hands he holds a book containing every true proposition. Nothing is left out, and nothing can ever be added to the set of propositions contained therein. The book is not to be had for free. In exchange, you must give up something dear. You may give up your ability to perceive beauty—for the rest of your life Beethoven will be indistinguishable from vicious animals growling at one another. You may give up the use of all four of your limbs. You may give up your emotional and sexual health, leaving you a sad, lonely person with unnatural and despicable urges. You may give up the ability to ever feel human love again.

Confronting you is the question of the value of truth. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed the highest value for truth, placing it above all else. But if you had to make the choice between truth and some other valuable thing in life, would you really choose truth? Not everyone would agree that truths can be found in propositions like this. For example, a pragmatist may say that truths are embodied in functional processes. A Platonist or Christian may assert that truth is something lived or conformed to through the virtues and the intellect. But surely, the ambiguous nature of truth cannot be used to argue in favor of its supreme value. Upon inspection it would seems that the propositionalist, the pragmatist, and the Platonist are actually talking about different things, despite all using the word 'truth'.

For modern man, however, truth is conceived primarily as proposition. A true proposition is one that accurately corresponds to reality, or accurately reflects reality. These are the sorts of propositions that are largely taught in schools. These are the sorts of propositions that scientists seek to lay down in systems called theories. These are the sorts of propositions that we call facts. How important are true propositions to you, and how do they compare to the other valuable things in your life?

For further reflections on this topic, see Nietzsche's On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, one of Nietzsche's pieces which inspired this thought experiment.

An Introduction to Tropes

Since they have cropped up in a number of discussions before and arguably form an indispensable part of the metaphysics of 'Classical Realism', Scholastic Realism very much included, I thought it would be worth doing an all-round intro post on the subject of tropes. First of all a terminological distinction: the term 'tropes' and 'property-instance' will be used synonymous throughout this post, though the former is often used in the context of a certain kind of Nominalism it is in fact neutral as to whether one also includes universals in one's ontology. The term property-instance on the other hand might imply a realist commitment with said entities being instances of something above them. The phenomenologically inclined will of course also recognize tropes/property-instances as being equivalent to Husserl's 'moments'.

Could a Child Refute Eliminativism?

I was going to write an argument, inspired by one of Lycan's, against eliminativism. It, however, looks like Lycan himself beat me to it (with comments by Vallicella here).

FAQ: Substances and the Problem of Individuation

Another FAQ from the reading group. I was fond of apples at the time:

What is a substance?

A substance is something that bears properties but is not itself borne by anything else.

What's the difference between a substance-attribute theorist and a bundle theorist?

Substance-attribute theorists think a flower an irreducible-substance-instantiating-properties; bundle theorists, nothing more than a unity of properties. Substance-attribute theorists think there are irreducible substances; bundle theorists, that they're reducible to bundles of universals or tropes.

(Technical note: Having written this, there is a sense in which some bundle theorists substantialize first-order properties so those properties can themselves have properties.)

What is the Problem of Individuation?

Moreland writes:

To clarify . . ., recall Socrates and Plato, two red, round spots that share all their pure properties in common. The problem of individuation is the problem of offering an ontological [account] of the situation so as to specify what it is that makes the two red spots two particular, individual entities instead of one. (Universals)

Most people would use two red apples, not dots.

Sens and Sensibility: A Few Days on Another Planet

An article from the Peter Hitchens archives. Worth reading.